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**1962/10/23**

1. Alternatives. a. Do nothing. At the present time this is not an appropriate stance.

b. Attack all antiaircraft sites. This may appear a disproportionate reaction to our Allies. The same can be said for an attack on all offensive missile sites. Having failed to take this action in the first instance, we require a more plausible case for doing so than the loss of one U.S. aircraft which wide segments of world (neutral) opinion will believe is justified as a "classical" invasion of air sovereignty (see 2, below, for doctrinal basis of continued surveillance).

c. Attack and destroy the offending antiaircraft battery (which may be technically impossible); or take some other measured, appropriate counteraction against their antiaircraft installations, or against other counter-air instruments or installations (e.g., fighter aircraft or airfields).

2. In the spirit of the President's initial measured response to the crisis, the third course seems the most appropriate. If it is to be taken, however, it would best be announced in advance. It is now Hemispheric doctrine

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(October 3 communique, reaffirmed in the President's speech of October 22) that secrecy with respect to military dispositions in Cuba is counter to the Hemisphere's interest and to its agreed treaty documents. Moreover, we have made clear that we are conducting surveillance of Cuba, as a legal Hemispheric collective security measure.

3. It is, therefore, recommended that we announce in advance that, pursuant to Hemispheric doctrine, we are now conducting surveillance of Cuba; and that we will respond by attacking and destroying the offending antiaircraft battery or in other appropriate ways if our aircraft are attacked or shot down; and surveillance will continue. Such retaliatory attacks will be conducted in ways designed to minimize Cuban casualties.

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